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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
common law, they would appear equally to apply under the Code via
its requirement that issuers and transfer agents must always act
in good faith.1
7
ERNEST L. FOLK, III*
Military Law-Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel Applied
to Special Court-Martial
Petitioner in Application of Stapley,' a private first class in the
regular Army, was tried for and convicted of four violations' of the
Uniform Code of Military Justice by special court-martial convened
at Fort Douglas, Utah. He was sentenced to be confined at hard
labor for three months, to forfeit fifty-five dollars of his pay per
month for six months and to be reduced in rank to private. At the
outset petitioner requested that he be represented by a qualified mili-
tary lawyer. His request was denied, and he was told that to retain
individual civilian counsel would cost about 150 dollars. Unable to
pay that amount, he proceeded to trial represented by a captain in
the Veterinary Corps and a second lieutenant, "neither . . . [of
whom] had any experience before or with any court-martial or in
advising persons charged with offenses."3 Acting on their advice,
petitioner entered into a pretrial agreemen with the convening
authority, pleaded guilty to all charges, made no request for enlisted
members on the court, did not object at the trial to the denial of
" Under the Code, the transfer agent has a duty of good faith running
to the holder or owner of securities. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-8-406(1) (b).
"'Good faith' means honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction con-
cerned." N.C. GEN. STAT. § 25-1-201(19). On good faith, see Folk, supra
note 21, at 708.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill.
'246 F. Supp. 316 (D. Utah 1965).
' UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE arts. 86 (unauthorized absence),
90 (willful disobedience of a superior commissioned officer), 117 (provok-
ing speech or gestures), 123a (making, drawing or uttering check, draft
or order without sufficient funds), 10 U.S.C. §§ 886, 890, 917, 923a (1964)
[hereinafter cited as UCMJ].
'246 F. Supp. at 319.
'A pretrial agreement is an administrative procedure, or "negotiated
plea," whereby the accused agrees to enter a plea of guilty to all charges
in return for a guarantee that any sentence in excess of a stipulated maxi-
mum (here two months confinement and two months forfeiture of pay)
will be disapproved.
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his request for counsel and said only "yes sir" or "no sir" to ques-
tions asked by the court.
Without seeking review of his conviction through military chan-
nels, petitioner applied to the Federal District Court for the District
of Utah for a writ of habeas corpus. The court issued the writ,
holding that the sixth amendment right to counsel applied to this
special court-martial. The court concluded that because the facts
involved substantial charges of moral turpitude and considerable
risk of incarceration, counsel with training beyond that common to
all military officers was required.5
The court felt that it was
appropriate, timely and necessary to recognize that it may be
repugnant to minimal requirements of due process, even in the
military service, for the juridically blind to lead the blind under
a system or in a particular command accepting this as the rule
rather than a militarily necessitated exception . . . [and that the
sixth amendment's right to] assistance of counsel, however
adaptably we may interpret the term in view of military expedi-
ency, cannot be constitutionally debased to mean the substantial
absence of any legal assistance .... 6
Within the framework of the military judicial system, the
United States Court of Military Appeals7 held in United States v.
Culp8 that the accused in a special court-martial, as distinguished
from a general court-martial,9 is not entitled to lawyer counsel.'0
5 The Justice Department did not appeal the decision. Charlotte Ob-
server, Dec. 1, 1965, p. 7A, col. 5. Apparently the thought was that Stapley
would not receive immediate acceptance in other judicial districts. See notes
34-35 infra, and accompanying text.
'246 F. Supp. at 322.
7A statutory court vested with the power of final review of courts-
martial proceedings. UCMJ art. 67, 10 U.S.C. § 867 (1964).
a 14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 33 C.M.R. 411 (1963).
' There are three types of courts-martial: general, special and summary.
The primary difference is sentencing power. A general court-martial is
empowered to impose the maximum statutory sentence for any offense. The
special court-martial is limited in power to a sentence of six months con-
finement for any offense while the summary court-martial is limited to a
sentence of thirty days confinement for any offense. See UCMJ arts. 18-20,
10 U.S.C. §§ 818-20 (1964).
" The UCMJ requires in general courts-martial cases that every accused
be represented by free appointed military counsel, free military counsel of
accused's own choice, or by civilian counsel paid for by the accused. How-
ever in a special court-martial case, if the government is represented by a
nonlawyer (the situation in the principal case), the accused need only be
represented by "counsel" with substantially similar training-or lack thereof.
UCMJ art. 27, 10 U.S.C. § 827 (1964).
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Each of the three judges wrote separate opinions, yet all concluded
for differing reasons" that a qualified lawyer was not required.
Thus petitioner Stapley could assert no denial of "military due
process"' 2 by having been refused the services of a military lawyer
in such circumstances.
From the standpoint of civilian constitutional law, it is clear
that federal courts have habeas corpus jurisdiction over military
prisoners.'" But to what extent that jurisdiction encompasses con-
sideration of alleged denials of constitutional due process is debat-
able. In a two-step argument, petitioner Stapley first contended that
the United States Supreme Court in Burns v. Wilson, 4 while deny-
ing the writ, said that civil courts have jurisdiction to consider
due process denials if those denials are so extreme as to deprive the
inilitary tribunal of its jurisdiction.'" Secondly, he contended that
since due process now includes the right to counsel in a state criminal
trial, the military court had by denying his request for a lawyer
deprived him of such a fundamental right that it was without juris-
diction.' 6
Burns was decided in 1953 and contains four separate opinions,
" Sixth amendment right to counsel does not apply to courts-martial,
14 U.S.C.M.A. 199, 215-16, 33 C.M.R. 411, 427-28 (1963) (opinion of
Kilday, J.); sixth amendment right to counsel does apply, but appointment
of nonlawyer counsel satisfies, id. at 217, 33 C.M.R. at 429 (opinion of
Quinn, C.J.); sixth amendment right to counsel applies, but the accused is
not deprived of his rights because he chose to be defended by nonlawyer
counsel, id. at 219, 33 C.M.R. at 431 (opinion of Ferguson, J.).
" The traditional Supreme Court view is that "to those in the military
or naval service of the United States the military law is due process. The
decision, therefore, of a military tribunal acting within the scope of its lawful
powers cannot be reviewed or set aside by the courts." Reaves v. Ainsworth,
219 U.S. 296, 304 (1911). See also United States ex rel. French v. Weeks,
259 U.S. 326, 335 (1944); United States ex rel. Innes v. Hiatt, 141 F.2d
664 (3d Cir. 1944). This authority was acknowledged by the civilian court
of appeals in the Burns case hereafter discussed. Burns v. Lovett, 202 F.2d
335, 341 (D.C. Cir. 1952). The decision in Culp, supra note 11, then, has
the effect of a declaration by the Court of Military Appeals that denial of
a lawyer in a special court-martial is not a denial of military due process.
" Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879).
'346 U.S. 137 (1953), rehearing denied, 346 U.S. 844 (1953).
" This argument was prompted by the basic rule that the only ground
for habeas corpus relief is lack of jurisdiction on the part of the sentencing
court. Traditionally, inquiry may extend to whether the court was legally
constituted, whether it had jurisdiction of the offense charged and of the
person tried, and whether it imposed a sentence within the maximum limits.
See AYcocK & WURFEL, MILITARY LAW UNDER THE UNIFORM CODE OF
MILITARY JUSTICE 365 & n.201 (1955).
"e Brief for Petitioner, p. 2, Application of Stapley, 246 F. Supp. 316
(D. Utah 1965).
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the rationale in none of which captured the assent of more than
four justices." While Mr. Chief Justice Vinson's opinion does
seem to say that military habeas corpus jurisdiction extends to due
process denials, it is important in assessing its force in the principal
case to keep in mind the facts and the Court's holding there. Peti-
tioners were convicted of murder and rape and sentenced to death by
a general court-martial."8 The sentence was approved by the Board
of Review, the Court of Military Appeals and the President. In
an application for habeas corpus petitioners alleged, inter alia, illegal
detention, coerced confessions and denial of counsel and effective
representation. 9 The allegations concerned matters outside the
original record of trial, but all were considered upon military appel-
late review. In the eyes of one judge of the civilian court of appeals
these allegations would, if proved, have constituted a denial of
civilian due process.20 Yet the possibility of denial of due process
and the imposition of the death sentences notwithstanding, the Su-
preme Court denied the writ holding that military habeas corpus
jurisdiction included due process review only to determine whether
the military judicial system gave fair consideration to each conten-
tion raised by the petitioners.2 '
Burns does not seem to be good authority upon which to base
the decision in Stapley. That case did contain allegations of serious
due process denial and involved death sentences, but the issue of
absence of representation was not presented and the writ was
The judgment of the Court, announced by Mr. Chief Justice Vinson
and in which Justices Reed, Burton and Clark joined, affirmed the lower
court's dismissal of the application for habeas corpus on the ground that,
having found that the military had given fair consideration to petitioners'
claims, the civil court had performed its function. 346 U.S. at 144. Mr.
Justice Jackson concurred in the judgment of the Court without opinion.
Mr. Justice Minton concurred in the judgment, but on the ground that the
sole function of the civil courts is to determine whether "the military court
has jurisdiction, not whether it has committed error in the exercise of thatjurisdiction." Id. at 147. Mr. Justice Douglas, joined by Mr. Justice Black,
dissented on the ground that the civil courts had jurisdiction to review
military decisions where the military had not fairly and conscientiously
applied the Supreme Court's due process standards and that here the un-
disputed facts showed there had been a failure to properly apply those
standards. Id. at 150-55. Mr. Justice Frankfurter in a separate opinion,
neither concurring nor dissenting, felt that the case should be set down for
reargument since issues of far-reaching importance were involved. Id. at
148-50.18Id. at 138.
:' Burns v. Lovett, 202 F.2d 335, 343, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
oId. at 348-53 (opinion of Bazelon, J., dissenting).
'1346 U.S. at 144.
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denied." Whatever view one takes of the subsequent expansion of
due process and the right to counsel,23 the facts in Burns, if not the
holding, drastically restrict its applicability in Stapley.
The court in Stapley recognized that the decisional basis for
petitioner's position was weak.24 Despite this, the Supreme Court's
concept of due process has expanded considerably since Burns. The
rationale in Stapley seems to be that this factor, coupled with the
increased speed and ease of transportation, the availability of mili-
tary lawyers and, although not mentioned by the court, the increased
effect of the draft in what is now a wartime situation, requires that
an accused in these circumstances 25 be given the right to representa-
tion by a trained lawyer. 6 In essence the court's conclusion is that
if the right to trained counsel is not the law, it should be. Mr.
Chief Justice Warren has given apparent off-the-bench support to
such a conclusion. In a speech at the New York University Law
Center in 19627 he commented that on the basis of Burns v. Wil-
son28 courts-martial proceedings could be challenged by habeas corpus
and that "our citizens in uniform may not be stripped of basic
rights simply because they have doffed their civilian clothes. ' 29
It is appropriate here to note that Congress has before it eighteen
proposed amendments to the Uniform Code of Military Justice de-
signed further to protect the constitutional rights of servicemen. 0
These are the result of hearings and protracted research by the
Senate Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Constitutional
Rights." While the amendments would substantially increase the
"- There was no denial of counsel found in Burns, since the accused were
represented by lawyers. In fact, the majority opinion of the court of appeals
decision below states that the "accused were vigorously defended at all
points." 202 F.2d 335, 347 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
2 Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
' "The precedential structure within, or upon t1e periphery of which,
these conclusions have been reached . . . are indicated in the margin." 246
F. Supp. at 321-22 (footnotes omitted). (Emphasis added.)
5 The circumstances were petitioner's youth, the frustration of his efforts
to obtain qualified legal counsel and the fact that the charges involved
claimed moral turpitude and risk of substantial incarceration. Id. at 318, 321.26 Id. at 321.
"' Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 181
(1962). The address was delivered as the third James Madison Lecture on
February 1, 1962.
28346 U.S. 137 (1953).29 Warren, op. cit. supra note 27, at 188.
S. 745-62, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).Creech, Congress Looks to the Serviceman's Rights, 49 A.B.A.J. 1070
(1963).
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rights of military personnel, including a requirement that the ac-
cused be represented by a lawyer before special courts-martial where
a bad conduct discharge can be awarded, 2 they would not provide
a lawyer to the accused where no bad-conduct discharge can result.
Historically the premise upon which denial of certain constitu-
tional rights to those in the military rests is that proper order and
discipline cannot otherwise be achieved.33 Nevertheless, a substan-
tial argument can be made that the guarantee of a lawyer in special
courts-martial would have little adverse affect on the maintenance
of discipline.34 One author in the field of military justice has pro-
posed to the Constitutional Rights Subcommittee that its bill to
abolish summary courts-martial be extended to include special
courts. This would insure that each military criminal prosecution
would be before a general court-martial with the due process pro-
tection there afforded, including the right to legally qualified counsel.
The present provisions for non-judicial punishment for minor
offenses would of course remain in force.
35
The problem raised in Stapley of providing legally trained coun-
sel in courts-martial is far from settled and probably will not be
resolved until the issue is presented to the Supreme Court. Subse-
quent to the principal case, the Federal District Court for the Dis-
trict of Kansas has denied an application for habeas corpus by a
serviceman who did not request a lawyer until after trial by special
court-martial. That court distinguished Stapley on the ground that
it was limited to its facts. 6 The California District Court of Ap-
peals for the Second District, however, has held that a national
" S. 750, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
" Comment, Constitutional Rights of Servicemen Before Courts-Martial,
64 COLUm. L. REv. 127, 131 (1964). This is the substance of "military
exigency" to which the court alludes. 246 F. Supp. at 320. For opposing
views as to a historical basis for applicability of the Bill of Rights to the
military, see Henderson, Courts-Martial and the Constitution: The Original
Understanding, 71 HAiv. L. REv. 293 (1957); Wiener, Courts-Martial and
the Bill of Rights, 72 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1958).
"The UCMJ already expressly prohibits self-incrimination, cruel and
unusual punishments and command influence on courts-martial personnel.
UCMJ arts. 31, 55, 37, 10 U.S.C. §§ 831, 855, 837 (1964). These guarantees
have brought no discernible protest of damage to the military's capability
to maintain discipline. In this setting, the addition of the right to a lawyer
would hardly seem likely to raise difficulties.
"8 Statement of Professor Seymour W. Wurfel to the Subcommittee on
Constitutional Rights, p. 3, January 25, 1966.
" Le Ballister v. Warden, United States Disciplinary Barracks, 247 F.
Supp. 349 (D. Kan. 1965).
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guardsman tried by a summary court-martial, where no counsel is
provided, was entitled to object to such trial and to be tried by a
special or general court-martial where counsel is provided."7
Many servicemen tried by special courts-martial are young and
are draftees. In civilian life, from which they have recently come,
one's right to a lawyer has been upheld in a misdemeanor case in
which a sentence of ninety days was imposed. 8 Considering these
factors and the fact that a court-martial conviction can frequently
have effects that continue in civilian life, perhaps the military should
no longer be, in the words of the case here noted, "a constitutionally
uninhabitable wasteland beyond even the scan of the Great Writ
where the court is powerless to reach out a protective hand,"8 19 at
least as far as providing legal counsel is concerned.
PHILIP L. KELLOGG
Torts-Police Immunity-Civil Rights Arrests
The Fifth Circuit decision in Pierson v. Ray1 illustrates the pre-
dicament of police officers, both at common law and under federal
statute, with respect to liability for torts arising out of the official
scope of their authority. In Pierson police officers arrested plaintiffs,
participants in a civil rights pilgrimage, for disorderly conduct under
a Mississippi statute2 when they attempted to enter a coffee shop
in a bus terminal. They were convicted at a trial before a police
justice but on appeal to the county court, where there was a trial
de novo, were found not guilty. They then brought suit against
the arresting officers in federal district court alleging a common-law
tort claim for false imprisonment and a statutory claim for depriva-
" Application of Palacio, 48 Cal. Rptr. 50 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965). In a
special court-martial however, under the UCMJ, "counsel" need not be a
lawyer. Hence this state case does not really shed light on the principal
question of the right to legal counsel.38Harvey v. Mississippi, 340 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965).
246 F. Supp. at 322.
1352 F.2d 213 (5th Cir. 1965), petition for cert. filed, 34 U.S.L. WEEK
3306 (U.S. Mar. 8, 1966) (No. 1074).
2 The statute in effect provides that whoever congregates in any public
accommodation where a breach of the peace is threatened and fails to dis-
perse when ordered to do so by any law enforcement officer is guilty of
disorderly conduct. MIss. CODE ANN. § 2087.5 (Supp. 1964).
[Vol. 44
